With the increasing economic and strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific region coupled with maritime disputes, piracy and Chinese assertions in the region, the European Union (EU) is concerned about its impact on secure, open and free passage and rule based global order. Distinguished from the hard foreign policy measures of the US, the EU strategy is to engage China through discussions and negotiations and at the same time to increase its depth of relations on wide ranging issues with the countries of the region to deny unilateral advantage to China. Pursuance of this parallel course of action is a challenging task as not all EU member states share common perception about China and very the design of the EU preventing its ‘actorness’ in external relations. With apparent exclusive and inward looking policies of the US under Trump 2.0, War in Ukraine and impact of refugee crisis affecting the EU attention towards Indo-Pacific, the EU role as a credible actor is likely to be further affected unless the EU addresses the host of internal and external issues and challenges while performing the balancing act between its preferred “strategic autonomy” and alignment and active engagement with others with cautious approach towards China. The EU need to work closely with like-minded countries like India which broadly share EU’s views on rule based global order and stable, inclusive, free and secure Indo-pacific region.
The Indo-Pacific region stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the Pacific Islands has become the center of global attention due to its growing economic and geopolitical significance.
The EU has recognized the increasing significance of the region and the need to engage with the region for its benefit. Today almost 90% of the EU’s external freight trade is seaborne. Much of this trade passes through maritime chokepoints in the Indo-Pacific region such as the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. With €1120 billion in imports and €645 billion in exports in 2022, the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly becoming important for the EU.
Although the EU is not a major actor in the Indo-Pacific region, considering the significant share of the region in the EU’s trade and its profound preference for rule of law, China’s actions are a matter of concern to the EU. However, given the trade ties with China and its ‘civilian’ approach, the EU avoids confrontation or provocation of China. Instead, it prefers a balancing act and has sought to engage positively with the region to ensure open access and freedom of navigation by strengthening its long-term relations with its countries without adversely affecting its relation with the US. In its alignments, rather than to ride piggyback on US, it has preferred to align independently with the ‘concert of Indo-Pacific countries led by the US’.
EU was deeply involved in the Western Indian Ocean region (WIO) since 2008 through its counter piracy operation such as ATLANTA. It has invested sufficient resources in the WIO sub- region to ensure maritime security. Its “Critical Maritime Routes in the Indian Ocean” (CRIMARIO) I (2014) programme was created to enhance maritime domain awareness through information sharing, capacity building and training in the Western Indian Ocean region. The CRIMARIO II (2020) expanded the geographical scope of the project towards South and Southeast Asia as well as to the Pacific with an aim to inter-connect the Indo-Pacific, through cross-sectoral, inter-agency and trans-regional cooperation providing a holistic framework to maritime security.
In pursuance of its objectives, the EU periodically evolved strategies for dealing with Indo-pacific. This includes a Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific in 2021 which emphasized seven priority areas in dealing with Indo-Pacific such as sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital governance and partnerships, connectivity, security and defence, and human security.
To “promote an open and rules-based regional security architecture, including secure sea lines of communication, capacity-building and enhanced naval presence in the Indo-Pacific” the EU has sought to work closely with ASEAN and “like-minded partners through operational cooperation on the ground” including a series of joint naval exercises and port calls” as worked out with Japan, Republic of Korea, Djibouti and India.
With mutuality of interests and recognizing the significance of bilateral Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) which EU already had with many of its partners in the region and with negotiations for a new Partnership Agreement with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries in the final stage, the EU showed interest in new PCAs with Thailand, Malaysia and Maldives. The EU has indicated that it would “deepen its engagement with partners that already have Indo Pacific approaches of their own - ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States”.
Translating strategies into practice, the blueprint for closer relation with ASEAN was crafted in the ASEAN-EU Plan of Action (2023-2027), which focused on series of promotional measures like strategic dialogue and maritime cooperation for Political and Security cooperation and Economic cooperation.
On 14 December 2022, EU officially signed PCA with Thailand and Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Malaysia. This is besides a large number of cooperation agreements on diverse areas that EU had with South East Asian countries.
Similarly, EU has built a close relation with India that happens to be EU’s strategic partner since 2004 and shares broadly its commitment to effective multilateralism and rule-based global order. Besides, having several trade and cooperation agreements and Joint Action framework in place and, in tune with the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, the collaboration between the EU and India is steered by the EU-India Strategic Partnership: A Roadmap to 2025 (an offshoot of EU-India Summit on 15th July 2020) that among others seek to “enhance convergences and work together to maintain peace, stability, safety and security, especially in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, by cooperating to preserve freedom, openness and an inclusive approach in the maritime domain...Work together on maritime initiatives for mutually-beneficial cooperation in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific”.
With China the EU position has been of engagement but with caution. While EU has an active economic cooperation and diplomatic engagement with China, it was also watching with concern the growing influence and assertions of China and its larger impact. The EU's China policy is defined in the 'Elements for a new EU Strategy on China' (2016) and 'Council Conclusions EU Strategy on China' (2016) which were reviewed in 2019 in the 'EU-China Strategic Outlook'. The latter clearly states that “based on clearly defined interests and principles, the EU should deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at global level’ and ‘The EU should robustly seek more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship.”
The EU is aware that China is pursuing its ambitious foreign policy embedded in its economic bait with such projects like Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) with debt trap implications, and aggressive military postures especially in the South China Sea. Already China’s aggressive diplomacy and threatening military actions in its neighbourhood, its gross human rights violations in Xinjiang, arbitrary application of the national security law in Hong Kong, interference in Taiwan’s internal politics and the Covid-19 pandemic have created a negative perception about China in the EU member-states.
But at the same time, China is the EU’s second largest trading partner for goods after the United States, with bilateral trade reaching €739 billion in 2023.
Notwithstanding the apprehension, the EU is not able to take a consistent unified position on China. Countries like Germany, France and the Netherlands consider the region as crucial for geo-political and economic purposes and have their own national guidelines for the Indo-pacific. They are also concerned about growing Chinese influence in the region. Others are cool on developments in Indo-pacific, and smaller countries like Malta, Luxembourg do not see security as priority area in the Indo-Pacific region. Some other EU members like Greece and Portugal are the recipients of Chinese BRI projects/ investments and are opposed to targeting China. Similarly, Hungary is part of the Budapest-Belgrade Railway, which is regarded among the BRI’s flagship projects in Europe.
Quite contrary, for many, prominently the Central European and Baltic states, supporting the US globally in order to ensure the US’s continued commitment to Europe’s security is of central importance. It was also observed by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) research that different EU member-states have different understanding of the aim of the EU’s Indo-pacific strategy, with some like Finland, Sweden, Netherlands, Ireland, Czech Republic and Slovakia viewing it as a way to show Europe’s strategic autonomy by pursuing and independent European approach to the region, others like Belgium, Lithuania and Latvian policy makers view it as tool against China, and some others like Estonia, Latvia, Poland as a means to manage the transatlantic relationship and more or less explicitly align with the US.
This divergence in perspectives has largely affected the EU’s common position on the region, particularly the nature of relation with China. Nonetheless, EU has refused to be drawn into US-China friction and has sought to purse its own independent soft power approach even though the internal divergence with regard to China has made the EU common position difficult. In this balancing act, while cooperation exists with China on global issues like climate change, the EU is watching with concern the Chinese actions in the Indo-pacific region and its impact on rule-based global governance. It is pursuing a challenging task of engaging China in its own terms through dialogues and discussions but avoiding of confrontation. Therefore, despite the consideration of issues in Pacific Ocean such as Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China as the security challenges in the region, the EU has not intrusively entered the South Eastern region in security related issues. In Asia Pacific its modest presence is more focussed in the Indian Ocean region. In the North West Indian Ocean it has established a framework called Co-ordinated Maritime Presence (CMP) to Co-ordinate EU member-states’ existing naval assets that are already present in the region.
This balancing act is a complex and a challenging task. There is already a power struggle in the Indo-pacific with both the US and China signalling pursuance of their hard positions in the region with their own world-views. Given the EU’s divergent views on China’s outreach activities in and outside the Indo-pacific region, lack of significant military strength of its own in the region, dependence on the US for military support and balancing equation with regional powers like India, Australia and Japan on one hand and with China on the other, whether the EU will be successful in projecting its power and influence in the region is to be seen. Further, EU’s position as organisation of states and dependence on its member states for continued action restricts its ‘actorness’ of the state and furthering of effective policies, especially when member states do not follow EU mechanism for their own perceived interests. There is already an apprehension of US’s ability to continue as a security provider for Europe and the perception appears to have witnessed upward swing with assumption of power by Trump as the US President for the second time. Coupled with this is the likely focus of the US on China to the neglect of European interest elsewhere. The war in Ukraine and migration issues has already impacted the EU’s attention towards the region that at the minimum at present. While its progress in its Indo-pacific strategy cannot be disregarded, addressing the host of internal and external issues and challenges is important for EU to sustain as a credible actor in the region and the EU has a tough task of maintaining a balance between its preferred “strategic autonomy” in the region, and alignment and active engagement with others in the region. On a different note, the EU’s preference for rule based global order, multi-dimensional and inclusive growth and “network of partnerships’ is likely to have a positive impact on strengthening of EU-India relations and common search for an inclusive, stable, free and secure Indo-pacific region.
Giulio Pugliese argues that “from the very conception, the Indo-Pacific was meant to be a counter narrative charged with strategic connotations, to balance, contain or simply dilute China’s regional footprint…”, See reference
The German scholar Karl Haushofer first used the word "Indo-Pacific" in the 1920s in his writings on geography and geopolitics. In recent times the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe referred to the "confluence" of the Indian and Pacific Oceans in his speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007. Since 2010 the word has acquired a strategic and geopolitical connotation. However, the countries differ in their understanding of the extent of the region. For instance, Indian policymakers envision the Indo-Pacific as a vast expanse extending from East Africa to the Americas. See, Walter Ladwig, “The Indo-Pacific in Indian Foreign Policy”,