IBCs are globalised localities, sub-state zones, or regions whose economic and social life is notably influenced by their nearness to an international frontier 18 Asiwaju, 1996). Dokoupil and Havlicek (2002)19 define an IBC as a region or territory nearest to the country's border, affected by recurrent border effects, or an area seen as a border by the majority of the population. Thus, IBC applies to a dynamic area, or areas joined by pecuniary interest and cultural realities, but suffers from being caught between different state economic policies. IBCs are highly susceptible to fluctuations in international relations due to national, regional, and global policies fostered by marginal socioeconomic and infrastructural development, most visible is the GDP per capita 20. Over the years, the dynamic of the IBCs on the national economy has been hotly debated among policymakers and scholars, with many viewing IBCs as an impediment to development.

A country's border can adversely affect the development of the border community by reducing the area of influence and increasing transaction costs, negatively impacting trade and production. 

According to Capello, Caragliu, and Fratesi (2018) 21, inefficiency is a significant challenge in border communities, as they cannot utilise their resources like other regions due to their closeness to the border. Nonetheless, the nexus between the international borders and border communities on a nation's economic development is context-dependent, and the border characteristics play a significant role in this respect 20.

International Border Communities (IBCs) are often submerged by their international borders' presence, significance, and importance; their role in a nation's economy is contingent upon the approach with which the IBCs are engaged and developed. For instance, the Seme, US-Mexico, and Pakistan-Indian borders are subjects of more frequent debates than the communities or regions housing them. However, when strategic policies are applied to IBCs to make them competitive, it births a border market that becomes an instrument for revenue, employment, and wage generation for proper trade initiatives. Yet, to fully explore IBCs' potential requires investment in human capital. The traditional perspective of IBCs as a marginal segment of the nation's economy must be jettisoned, particularly given the hurricane of globalisation and the opening up of trade in the 21st century.

The Chinese government strategic investment in physical assets and human capital instead of a focus on employment alone, contributed significantly to GDP growth per capita and enhanced improvement in the economy of the border communities in the Revitalized Border Areas and Enrich Resident Lives Policy (RBAERL) in China 22.

Also, the Sahel and West Africa Club in an empirical research assert that 38% of the city population in West Africa resides less than 100km from an international border. For instance, the distance from Lagos, Nigeria's most significant economic and commercial hub, to the Seme international border is about 83.1km. Therefore, a large urban population close to IBCs should stimulate trade policies that reflect border markets as a central element of national economies. Where there exists a gap in state-controlled policies to create an avenue for a border market to regulate cross-border trade, the informal economy or smuggling becomes rampant due to the activities of business people in these cities who are either trying to make more profit or evade customs duties. 

The exploitation of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS) has become a strategic economic battle against Nigeria’s effort at economic development, particularly with the importation of products classified as contraband, relabeling, and repacking of foreign goods with the cooperation of some West African countries, which negates both the ECOWAS ETLS and WTO Rules of Origin 23. Hence, the government of the Benin Republic is either complicit or has chosen to disregard the intricacies of the trade between the two countries. This explains the frequent border closures adopted across the Seme and Idiroko international borders 24.

Furthermore, the hostilities towards border security officials by residents of IBCs and the prevalence of poverty in the area, amongst other factors, impede the State intervention in the management and control of trade across these border communities, leading to a kinetic approach like the Ex-Swift Response Drill. Also, the difference in price and tariffs between the Seme and Idiroko IBCs and their proximate nations, inadequate job opportunities, and the harsh economic conditions in border communities would continue to obstruct national economic development efforts that should have accrued from these border communities.

The Idiroko IBC is characterised by epileptic power supply, bad roads, poor health and sanitation facilities, which cannot support any meaningful economic growth, as its deplorable state constitutes a danger to both national security and the economy 25. Adeleye (2019), in an empirical study on the border communities of Shaki (Oyo State) and Seme (Lagos State), asserts that the socio-economic gap or difference between border communities and their core areas (cities), such as the wage gap, the variety of occupations obtainable, the mixture of nationalities, and vocational and educational opportunities, all contribute to the nature of issues and challenges peculiar to border communities. However, Adeleye (2019) paid little attention to the economic potential these communities possess.

Likewise, the absence of peace and security is one of the critical factors responsible for the inadequate development of border communities, as the components of peace, security, and development go hand in hand. The dysfunction of border security governance in Nigeria contributes to the nature and challenges of border communities as inadequate management of Nigeria's international borders exposes them to insecurity, as they become a hideout and transit routes for criminals and illicit activities 26. In such a condition devoid of peace, development becomes impossible; not only is investors' confidence reduced, but finance that should have been used for development is utilised for security purposes. 

Additionally, the fluctuations in government policies affect the ease of doing business in these communities; for instance, the November 2019 embargo placed on the supply of petroleum products within the bounds of 20km from Nigeria's land borders impacted heavily on businesses, especially as the duration of the embargo was not stated by the government. This decision affected businesses because most of them run on generators due to the erratic nature of electricity. The scarcity of petroleum products led to price exploitation between border communities and the nearby areas, as the former were forced to depend on them for petrol and diesel.  

Table 2 presents data on the customs value of imports through the Seme and Idiroko borders from 2010 to 2022. The table includes the total customs value, the percentage contribution of each border to the total customs value, Nigeria’s total non-oil import values, and the percentage of non-oil imports relative to the total.

These data, showing the trade balance, were analysed using Microsoft Excel through trend analysis to measure export and import trade value performance and volume across the two international border communities, Seme and Idiroko.

Table 3, Table 4 present the twelve-year trade performances for export and import through the Idiroko and Seme international borders in the two study areas.

Table 3 shows a noticeable fluctuation in import values over the years. The highest import value was recorded in 2011 (61.1 billion), and the lowest in 2022 (0.48 billion). Export values are generally lower compared to imports, with significant variability. The highest export value was in 2017 (7.77 billion), and the lowest in 2021 (7.27 million).

Balance of Trade: The trade balance has been negative for most years, indicating a trade deficit. However, in 2022, there was a trade surplus (+0.88 billion).

2010-2012: Showed substantial trade deficits, with the largest in 2011 (-60.7 billion). It suggests that imports far exceeded exports during this period.

2013-2015: Imports and the trade deficit decreased. The deficit decreased significantly in 2014 (-8.00 billion) compared to previous years.

2016-2017: Import values increased in 2016, but the trade balance significantly improved in 2017, reducing the deficit to -4.35 billion.

2018-2021: Fluctuating imports and generally low export values, leading to persistent trade deficits. The deficits in these years were relatively stable but still harmful.

2022: Marks a significant shift with a trade surplus. Imports are at their lowest, while exports are relatively high, resulting in a positive balance of trade (+0.88 billion).

The drastic reduction in imports (0.48 billion) significantly contributes to the trade surplus. Compared to previous years, an increase in exports to 1.36 billion supports the positive trade balance, which could indicate a shift in economic strategies or improvements in local production and export capabilities.

The data shows that the Idiroko border has a consistently negative trade balance throughout the given period. It implies that imports significantly exceed exports every year. Export values show considerable fluctuations, with a notable peak in 2017. However, there is a significant decline in exports from 2017 onwards, with 2020 showing zero exports. Import values are relatively high and have increased, peaking in 2021. 2020 has zero exports, resulting in a very high negative trade balance. It could be attributed to border closures, economic policies, or other disruptions. While the trade balance remains negative, the most substantial deficit occurred in 2021. The overall trend indicates increasing trade deficits, which can affect the region's economic health and trade policies. A persistently negative trade balance can lead to a depletion of foreign reserves and impact the currency value, leading to inflation and other economic challenges.

Hence, high imports should be discouraged, particularly for products that can be made in Nigeria and for the expansion of the country's export base. The government need to implement policies to boost exports, reduce dependency on imports, and improve trade balance. The data from the Idiroko border reveals a significant trade imbalance, with imports far outpacing exports. Addressing this imbalance will require strategic policy interventions to enhance export potential and manage import dependencies. Yet, border politics, a dishonest and fragile border security architecture, the elite class attachment to foreign goods and the exploitation of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People and Goods are the main factors adversely affecting trade between Nigeria and the Benin Republic 27.

Table 2

Year	Customs Value of Imports through SEME Border	Customs Value of Imports through IDIROKO Border	TOTAL Customs Value	SEME (%) total customs value on the two borders	IDIROKO (%) total customs value on the two borders	Nigeria’s total non-oil import (per Billion Naira)	% of total non -oil import
2010	138,092,218,381.00	15,633,417,292.00	153,725,635,510	89.8	10.2	6,406.80	2.4
2011	230,185,825,523.00	61,144,795,899.00	291,330,621,422	79	20.9	7,952.30	3.7
2012	34,638,144,145.00	54,020,141,810.00	88,658,285,955	39	60.9	6,702.30	1.3
2013	38,721,352,920	13,976,950,492.00	52,698,303,412	26.5	73.5	7,010.00	0.8
2014	32,324,286,817	10,818,604,642.00	43,142,891,459	74.9	25.1	8,323.70	0.5
2015	23,059,179,796	9,225,242,069.00	32,284,421,865	71.4	28.6	9,350.80	0.3
2016	35,803,416,680	18,619,695,703.00	54,423,112,383	65.8	34.2	7,096.00	0.8
2017	36,936,541,721	12,114,425,291.00	49,050,967,012	75.3	24.7	n/a	n/a
2018	27,973,080,103	10,674,431,644.00	38,647,511,747	72.4	27.6	n/a	n/a
2019	27,915,357,660	11,539,381,079.00	39,454,738,739	70.8	29.3	n/a	n/a
2020	571,500	12,664,386,829.00	12,664,958,329	0.004	99.9	n/a	n/a
2021	15,169,523,794	15,290,592,814.00	30,460,116,608	49.8	50.2	n/a	n/a
2022	8,321,341,743	482,472,444.00	8,803,814,187	94.5	5.5	n/a	n/a

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, (2010-2022)

Table 3

Idiroko	Import	Export	Balance of trade
2010	15,633,417,292.00	145,324,138.00	-15,488,093,154
2011	61,144,795,899.00	418,614,381.00	-60,726,181,518
2012	54,020,141,810.00	555,100,523.00	-53,465,041,287
2013	13,976,950,492.00	488,843,881.00	-1,348,810,6611
2014	10,818,604,642.00	2,813,713,622.00	-8,004,891,020
2015	9,225,242,069.00	1,257,637,135.00	-7,967,604,934
2016	18,619,695,703.00	2,603,957,566.11	-16,015,738,137
2017	12,114,425,291.00	7,768,088,390.19	-43,46,336,901
2018	10,674,431,644.00	2,920,874,840.80	-7,753,556,803
2019	11,539,381,079.00	537,982,293.48	-11,001,398,786
2020	12,664,386,829.00	-	-12,664,386,829
2021	15,290,592,814.00	7,270,432.50	-15,283,322,382
2022	482,472,444.00	1,359,746,597.02	877,274,153

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2023

Table 4

Seme	Import	Export	Balance of Trade
2010	138,092,218,381.00	44,641,824,506.00	-93450393875
2011	230,185,825,523.00	14,601,757,379.00	-2.15584E+11
2012	34,638,144,145.00	7,062,374,775.00	-27,575,769,370
2013	38,721,352,920	18,502,273,496	-20,219,079,424
2014	32,324,286,817	10,686,204,212	-21,638,082,605
2015	23,059,179,796	8,100,850,648	-14,958,329,148
2016	35,803,416,680	2,648,271,555	-33,155,145,125
2017	36,936,541,721	11,406,616,108	-25,529,925,613
2018	27,973,080,103	14,932,090,629	-13,040,989,474
2019	27,915,357,660	10,260,946,480	-17,654,411,180
2020	571,500	0	-571,500
2021	15,169,523,794	21,819,891,517	6,650,367,723
2022	8,321,341,743	21,470,982,372	13,149,640,629

Source: National Bureau of Statistics. 2023

Table 4 shows significant fluctuation in import values over the years. The highest import value was recorded in 2011 (230.2 billion), and the lowest in 2020 (0.57 million). Export values also show variability. The highest export value was in 2010 (44.6 billion), and the lowest in 2020 (0). The trade balance is primarily negative, indicating a trade deficit for most years. However, 2021 and 2022 show a trade surplus.

2010-2011: showed substantial trade deficits, with the largest in 2011 (-215.58 billion), suggesting that imports far exceeded exports during this period.

2012-2015: Both imports and the trade deficit decreased. The deficit in 2012 (-27.58 billion) decreased significantly by 2015 (-14.96 billion).

2016-2017: Imports rose again in 2016, but the trade balance remained negative. The deficit decreased slightly in 2017 (-25.53 billion) compared to 2016 (-33.16 billion).

2018-2019: Imports and exports have stabilised relative to each other, but trade deficits persist. The deficit in 2019 (-17.65 billion) is lower than in previous years.

2020: marks an anomaly with almost no imports (0.57 million) and no exports, resulting in a minimal deficit.

2021-2022: These years show a significant improvement with trade surpluses. In 2021, the surplus was +6.65 billion; in 2022, it increased to +13.15 billion. The significant reduction in imports in 2020, followed by moderate imports in 2021 and 2022, contributes to the trade surplus. A noticeable increase in exports in 2021 (21.82 billion) and 2022 (21.47 billion) supports the positive trade balance, indicating a shift in economic strategies or improvements in local production and export capabilities.

The trade data for Seme from 2010 to 2022 reveals significant fluctuations in import and export values, with persistent trade deficits until 2021 and 2022, when notable surpluses are recorded. Understanding the factors behind these trends can help formulate policies to achieve a more balanced and sustainable trade environment.

From 2013 to 2020, the trade balance was consistently negative, indicating that imports exceeded exports every year. It implies a trade deficit, which can have various economic implications, such as increased foreign debt and depletion of foreign reserves. In 2020, imports and exports dropped drastically, with imports as low as 571,500 and exports as zero. This significant drop could be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, which disrupted global trade and supply chains. The year 2021 shows a positive trade balance, with exports significantly exceeding imports (BoT: +6,650,367,723), indicating a trade surplus for the year, possibly due to a recovery in global trade post-pandemic, increased export activity, or reduced dependency on imports. The general trend from 2013 to 2019 shows a substantial trade deficit, with the highest deficit recorded in 2016. The trend shifted in 2021 with a notable trade surplus, marking a significant improvement in the trade balance. A persistent trade deficit can lead to increased borrowing, higher interest rates, and inflationary pressures, weakening the local currency and reducing the country's foreign exchange reserves 28.

The trade surplus in 2021 indicates a positive shift, potentially leading to a stronger currency, improved foreign reserves, and better economic stability. It also suggests that the country improved its export competitiveness or reduced import dependency. The balance of trade data for the Seme border from 2013 to 2021 reveals a period of consistent trade deficits, followed by a significant trade surplus in 2021. This shift could be indicative of economic recovery and improved trade policies post-pandemic.

Addressing the factors contributing to the trade deficits in previous years and maintaining the positive trend seen in 2021 will be crucial for long-term economic stability and growth. One of the economic outcomes of artificial boundaries is the occurrence of cross-border movements and unregulated trade (smuggling); this is strengthened when there exists an asymmetrical and kinship relationship between both proximate international border communities with the neighbouring country suffering losses in foreign exchange earnings and revenue 29.

Therefore, the recurrent deficit in the balance of trade from both IBCs impedes economic growth and development. However, sustaining the 2021 trade surplus from the Seme international border would require increasing domestic production and job creation in these communities, amongst other factors. Nevertheless, it is essential to consider other economic factors and longer-term trends to get a comprehensive view of the overall economic impact  30.

The analysis of the interviews revealed that the existing condition of the Seme and Idiroko IBCs cannot support economic development because the symbiotic relationship between the two study areas and national economic development is parasitic and competitive. Besides, the border communities' social, economic, and geographical complexity engenders a competitive symbiotic relationship in which one or both entities suffer losses. These poor economic conditions have remained an incentive to smuggling, resulting in substantial economic losses through sabotage created by smuggling

Also, the trend analysis showing the customs value of imports and exports through the Seme and Idiroko international borders located in these border communities and the Central Bank of Nigeria's non-oil export and import value for the study period show that the Seme and Idiroko IBCs, which serve as gateways, are significant and vital to the nation's Internally Generated Revenue (IGR) through customs duties. Thus, there is a significant relationship between the position of Seme and Idiroko IBCs and the attainment of national economic development. However, this relationship could be more positive and translate to effective development delivery in the two communities 34.

The economic activities in these IBCs reveal that a persistent trade deficit, even though marginal compared to the national average, has contributed negatively to Nigeria's economic development. This resonates with the analysis of the in-depth interviews, which shows that macroeconomic factors created by the Nigerian State harm the Nigerian economy and that community cooperation can impede or improve trade across borders. 

Findings from the study show that a multifaceted relationship exists between the Seme and Idiroko IBCs and the Nigerian government, which is neither mutual, parasitic nor fully commensalism. Both communities depict a situation of antagonistic co-evolution, reflecting the complexity of community structure. This is echoed in the interviews and custom trade import and export reports across both communities, as against the level of infrastructure in the communities. Although the government generates enormous revenue, the communities are not adequately invested. While the border community residents enhance smuggling through their superior knowledge of the illegal routes, the funds and proceeds are not re-invested, as evidenced by the deplorable state of the communities. Therefore, despite the awareness of the economic position of IBCs globally, Seme and Idiroko IBCs, like other border communities in Nigeria are generally characterised by neglect and impoverishment, which based on the principle of derivation has deprived them of equity and distributive justice.

Also, the study reveals that the knowledge deficit on the complex relationship between international borders, their host communities, and the national government is responsible for the output in national economic development derived from the Seme and Idiroko IBCs, the actions and inactions of the government have not shown an understanding of border economies, this is evident in its state-centric approach to border issues. The misconception between the term' border' and 'borderland' in cross-border trade underlines the undue focus on illegal trading activities, accounting for the derisory understanding of the region 35. This buttresses Guo (2016) and Hansen (1976) 18 position that the inadequate knowledge of border regions and their challenges is partly an effect, and a cause of the tenacious nationalism associated with international borders. Thus, a better understanding of the development processes underlying border region economies and analysis must, by definition, be international and be carried out in terms of functional economic areas. 

Additionally, border communities' industry, retail and service sectors are closely linked and contribute significantly to a State’s economic vitality; thus, understanding their economic position to national economic development is significant in refining policy decisions to improve quality of life in the areas, advance cross-border trade, and promote trade and industrial expansion. An inadequate knowledge leads to an "incomplete development pole," manifested by the lack of a job market, conflicting border management policies and customs barriers, and a propensity for illegal routes to run parallel with legal routes 36. This is the case of the Seme and Idiroko IBCs.

Furthermore, the findings showed that while the size of Nigeria compared to the Benin Republic and the high volume of trade via the Seme international border should be of comparative advantage to the nation, the lack of industries in Seme IBC has resulted in a low location quotient (LQ). A low LQ (location quotient is the measure of the concentration of industries in a sub-area relative to the nation or a neighbouring country) implies that the domestic economy of the border communities suffers a comparative disadvantage in a specific sector compared to other part of the country or the proximate country and is a net importer of goods and services, consequently transcending to the national economy 37, 38. In the case of the Seme and Idiroko IBCs, there are no industries.

Finally, a cursory look at the twelve-year performance of the customs trade value of exports and imports across both the Seme and Idiroko international borders indicates that the balance of trade between 2010 and 2022 showed a deficit, except for 2021 (Seme). History has shown that countries that are net importers are confronted with major economic hurdles and foreign exchange shocks leading to depreciation of domestic currency, and leading to high borrowing to fund imports, inadvertently increasing their national debt (U.S. Department of Commerce & the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2020). This is the current situation of Nigeria's economy today.

Investment in infrastructure and the adoption of functional economic policies must be prioritised to adequately position IBCs to contribute to national economic development.