



Journal of Contemporary Politics

Original Article

Caught in the Crossfire: Myanmarese Refugees in India

Priyanca Mathur^{1,*}

¹Head and Associate Professor, Centre for Research in Social Sciences and Education (CeRSSE), Jain (Deemed-to-be) University, Bengaluru, Karnataka, India

ARTICLE INFO

Article history:

Received 09.01.2023

Revised 25.02.2023

Accepted 13.03.2023

Published 25.03.2023

* Corresponding author.

Priyanca Mathur

mv.priyanca@jainuniversity.ac.in

[https://doi.org/](https://doi.org/10.53989/jcp.v2i1_2_priyanca)

10.53989/jcp.v2i1_2_priyanca



INTRODUCTION

The political violence that spread across Myanmar post the coup of February 1st, 2021 has compelled nearly 60,000 Myanmarese nationals to flee across the border into Indian soil. Old ethnic kinship ties (Kuki-Chin) and porosity of the international border shared with India's north-eastern states has facilitated this cross-border displacement. Legally, Myanmarese refugees continue to inhabit a grey area. Besides, the current scenario in the state of Manipur post the riots of May 4th 2023 onward has left refugees more at risk sandwiched between the warring Meitei and Kukis there.¹ While peace amongst all ethnic and religious groups is the need of the hour, the heightened vulnerability of refugees

within this civil war must not be ignored.

The author was part of a research project that mapped the protection needs of recent arrivals from Myanmar in Mizoram, Manipur and Delhi.² The geographical diversity of India as the host country greatly impacts the rights conditions of the Myanmarese refugees as the political context of each state is unique. Delhi, being the national capital, is the seat of Central government, and is ruled by the same party in power as in the state of Manipur. Both these sites have shown not as much a welcoming attitude towards refugees as Mizoram, which is hosting the biggest load. Thus, the political context at the state and regional level determines

¹For more details see EPW commentary <https://www.epw.in/journal/2023/19/comment/unfolding-manipur-riots.html>

²This article is an extract from an International Research Project of ASDP and APPRN that looked into the protection needs of Myanmarese Refugees in India conducted by the author. The author would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Ananya Kundu and Roshni Sharma.



the access to basic needs and services — while Delhi provides freedom of movement, Manipur is its complete opposite where first priority is to stay away from the public glare and hidden amongst their ethnic community. Meanwhile, Mizoram, stands out as the only state with an open receptive policy towards Myanmarese refugees, with every household, village and city also contributing towards their welfare.

Informal protection networks largely have become the safe space and place-to-go-to for all kinds of assistance. Community and faith-based organisations have contributed more towards refugee welfare than any state or national government, barring Mizoram. The regional difference in formal and informal protection mechanisms in (and not in) place is stark. In the absence of national refugee law or policy in India, the formal protection space that exists in positive judicial decisions and legal advocacy groups must be expanded. All state governments need to be sensitised to the principles in international humanitarian law on non-refoulement and against forced detention/deportation.

The absence of exit permits for Myanmarese refugees and lack of access to North East (NE) India for United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) India leaves refugees facing the severe challenge of travelling to UNHCR Delhi for access to documentation and formal refugee-status determination. Protection risks and needs of refugees spotlight access to safe shelter and reliable documentation. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Community-Based Organisations (CBOs), Women's Groups and faith-based organisations working with refugees at the grassroots need financial and resource support. Refugee women need access to sexual and gender based violence survivor support and nearly all respondents we spoke to require mental health support, given their trauma at having to flee their homeland amidst violence. Right to livelihood, right to education and right to health-care — without discrimination — should be provided to all refugees given their right to a basic human life with dignity, irrespective of which geographical location they are in.

In India, the intersectionality of the local, state and national levels reveals complete lack of awareness of the regional and international refugee protection regimes. Greater collaboration and synergy amongst all stakeholders to bring in more sensitisation towards the marginalised reality of refugee lives fleeing for life from Myanmar in the region is needed.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has estimated that the number of forcibly displaced persons in the world will reach 117.2 million in 2023¹. It also stated that 89.3 million people had been forcibly displaced globally due to conflict, human rights violations and persecution by the end of 2021, with an estimated 11.3 million in Asia alone². In such a scenario, it is woeful that the refugee

protection laws remain inadequate in South Asia with majority of the countries being neither signatories to either the 1951 Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol.³

Despite this India has continued to serve as a safe haven for thousands of refugees since it gained independence in 1947³. But unlike other non-signatory countries, India has no domestic law or policy applicable for refugees. The absence of a suitable legislation means that India arbitrarily deals with refugees on a case-to-case basis, dependent on prevalent political contexts, motivations of the political party in power, and socio-cultural factors⁴. Refugees are governed under The Foreigners Act, 1946, which is meant for foreigners voluntarily entering India — two completely different categories. The use of this Act on refugees ensures that there is no space to understand and address the unique vulnerabilities that refugees face. India can, at any point, label a certain group of refugees as “illegal immigrants” or treat them as defaulters under this Act. They can also deport any “foreign citizen” based on the government’s discretion⁵. Myanmarese refugees have been at the receiving end of this offensive behaviour from Indian authorities.

The cases of asylum seekers are shared between the Indian government and the UNHCR, with the former managing the greater share of the load. The Government of India (GoI) directly manages refugees arriving from its neighbouring states, mostly from Tibet and Sri Lanka; while UNHCR is mandated to provide documentation and determine refugee status for people arriving from non-neighbouring countries including Myanmar. Refugees from Myanmar fall into this grey zone, one that leads to significant protection gaps and impacts the lived experiences of refugees. There is a long-standing history of migration between India and Myanmar (then known as Burma), going back to colonial times. India has, in the past, provided refuge to migrants from Myanmar, including political figures. However, the post 2021 coup influx of refugees in India from Myanmar has met with apathy and resistance. India has cited concerns around national security to put greater restrictions in place⁶. This has consequently put the fate of vulnerable refugee communities or persecuted groups from Myanmar at stake, who till now, had perceived India as a safe option for asylum.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to 1947 a large number of Indians moved to Myanmar (then Burma) in search of work and business opportunities. However, Myanmar’s volatile socio-political conditions post-independence including military coups and ethnic conflict led to mass out-migration of not just settled Indians but also Myanmar nationals who fled military regimes and

³They are signatories to a number of other international conventions that contain protections like CRC, CAT, ICCPR etc. It is often argued that South Asian states’ rejection of international protocols stems from the fear that interventions by international agencies, coming in of humanitarian aid in refugee situations, etc. would gravely undermine their sovereignty, while also drawing unnecessary scrutiny to their internal situation.



political crackdowns. Many ethnic minorities and tribals also took refuge in India 1988 onward, to escape poverty and persecution⁷. They stayed in the North Eastern region of India where four states, viz., Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Mizoram, and Manipur, share a 1643 km long border with Myanmar, which has facilitated the movement of people between both countries. Over the decades, due to lack of infrastructure, job opportunities and resources in the North East, Myanmarese refugees have migrated northwards to the capital city of Delhi, undertaking odd jobs to make a living. In Delhi, those who are having the UNHCR refugee card as the only form of identification, has meant that they can only get access to work in the informal sector, where income is low, unstable, and there is little or no social security⁸. Even within these limited spaces, they have been attacks and abuse. In the past, women from refugee groups have reported experiencing sexual harassment by co-workers and locals, both, within and outside the workplace⁹. This has led to further marginalisation and spatial exclusion of refugee groups within urban city spaces like New Delhi¹⁰.

The persecution of ethnic minorities in Myanmar based on religious differences led to the two major refugee crises in the past decade - the Rohingya crisis, and the post-military coup exodus. Extensive scholarship already exists on the Rohingya refugee crisis which reached its peak in 2017, the year of the largest exodus due to the repression and brutal violence perpetrated by the military against the minority community of Rohingya Muslims living in the Rakhine state.⁴ It intensified in August 2017, when a deadly crackdown by the military led to the mass exodus of thousands of Rohingyas into neighbouring countries, seeking refuge¹¹. The recent second wave of refugees from Myanmar arrived after the 2021 military coup in the country. The National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Aung San Suu Kyi had secured a landslide victory in the general elections in Myanmar in November 2020. However, on 1st February 2021, Myanmarese military seized power after making claims of electoral fraud and voter irregularities, which the election observer organisations asserted to be completely false (Domestic Election Observer Organizations, 2021). NLD's key leaders, including Aung San Suu Kyi, were detained on that day after raids were carried out in their homes.⁵

⁴For more details see <https://www.unrefugees.org/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-explained/#:~:text=The%20Rohingya%20have%20suffered%20decades,to%20seek%20refuge%20in%20Bangladesh>

⁵After this, the military declared Myanmar to be in a state of emergency for a year and handed over power to the Chief of Army, Min Aung Hlaing (Reuters, 2021). The military brought about multiple charges against Suu Kyi and other NLD leaders, including breach of COVID-19 protocols during the election campaigns in 2020, corruption, violating the Official Secrets Act, etc. The coup led to large-scale protests all across Myanmar, with people coming together to demand that the junta relinquish power and restore the democratic government. On the other hand, civil society groups, activists, journalists, former parliamentarians, leaders of ethnic minority, etc. came together to form a shadow government (National Unity Government — NUG) (Maizland, L., & Kurlantzick, J. (2022) 'Myanmar's Troubled History:

The military responded by cracking down on protesters and committing severe atrocities. The junta killed protesters, forcefully disappeared hundreds of people, tortured and raped people in custody over the next several months¹². In the North Western and Western part of Myanmar, which lie close to the Indian border, the People's Defence Forces (PDF) which were created to protect people from military violence, clashed with Myanmar's military¹³. Violence also spread to major cities like Mandalay and Yangon. The army burnt homes, cut off electricity, internet and food supply, and shot at those fleeing¹⁴. Caught between the crossfire, people started fleeing to the neighbouring Thailand and India to save themselves. In India, refugees entered mainly through Manipur and Mizoram, both having porous borders with Myanmar. The UNHCR estimates that 53,500 Myanmarese refugees have entered India via Mizoram and Manipur⁶, between February 2021 and May 2023¹⁵.

SEEKING ASYLUM IN INDIA

The first wave of refugees, post-coup, started arriving in India from March 2021 through the North-East region. In this wave, refugees mostly consisted of students, teachers, activists, anti-coup protesters, lawmakers, civil servants, defected police, and army personnel. The majority of refugees were ethnic Chins, Kachins, and Karens. Reports highlighted that the impact of the army operations was most strongly felt in Chin State, Sagaing, and Kachin, which house the armed groups that were fighting the military junta for the longest time. As a result, maximum displacement took place in these regions¹⁶.

Mizoram, which shares a 510 km-long unfenced border with Myanmar, was the first state to receive refugees. Refugees, mainly from Chin-Kuki ethnic groups, also crossed over to Manipur through the 398 km-long border to enter Moreh. The GoI had issued a notice in February 2021, asking the Assam Rifles to stay alert and work towards preventing any possible movement of refugees from Myanmar to India. On 27th February, the Government of Mizoram put forth a Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) to ensure the smooth facilitation of refugees from Myanmar. On 9th March, Biren Singh, the Chief Minister (CM) of Manipur declared that he and his government were ready to welcome and offer assistance to any refugee who entered India to save themselves from the violence unleashing in Myanmar¹⁷.

However, on 10th March 2021, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) of India sent out two advisory letters to four North Eastern states sharing borders with Myanmar — Nagaland, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur and Mizoram,

Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict'. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at <https://www.cfr.org/background/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya>.

⁶Link to the regional report - <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/4813>



warning the Secretaries of the states of a possible influx of refugees coming in from Myanmar through the porous borders. The advisory stated that the state governments and union territories had no power to assign refugee status to any foreigner entering India; the country is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention 1951 or 1967 protocol and as a result, has no obligation to provide asylum¹⁸. The MHA also directed law enforcement agencies to identify illegal migrants and deport them¹⁹.

In response to this advisory, CM Biren Singh of Manipur took a complete turn from his previous promise, and the Government of Manipur, which has the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in power (the same party which holds power in the central government in New Delhi) asked its Deputy Commissioners not to open camps or offer food and shelter to refugees entering the state. The government instructed authorities to politely turn away refugees from the border²⁰. This order arrived at the time when the Ambassador of Myanmar to the United Nations issued an appeal to the Government of India, asking them to provide refuge to those fleeing Myanmar on humanitarian grounds²¹. A few days later, the Manipur government retracted its order suspecting public disapproval but it continued to maintain its stance against the refugee influx. Community groups in Manipur who share the same ethnic identity and ancestry with the refugees came forward to help, providing food, shelter and medical aid²². However, refugees entering Manipur continued facing detentions and arrests.⁷

On the other hand, Mizoram's Chief Minister, Zoramthanga, firmly rejected the Centre's advisory and called it unacceptable. He heads the Mizo National Front Party. He argued that the Chin community in Myanmar and Mizos share ethnic ties and have had close relations since the time of pre-independence. Therefore, they could not overlook this humanitarian crisis²³. In the parliament, he urged the GoI to provide aid to help the refugees in these critical times²⁴. Local NGOs, community groups, churches, international humanitarian organizations, and even few refugees came together to assist those coming into Mizoram by offering shelter, food and medical assistance. The Government of Mizoram started issuing temporary identity cards to the refugees²⁵. Relief work and refugee aid in Mizoram and Manipur have depended upon donations, fundraisers, funding from the church. In September 2021, attacks on a military camp in a village in Myanmar near Thingsai (the village closest to the border near Mizoram), led to a new wave of refugees entering Mizoram¹⁷.

With continued violence and crackdowns by the junta in Myanmar, the influx of refugees into India has continued, putting a strain on the limited resources available to the North East states. In a meeting with the Indian Prime Minister in July 2021, Chief Minister Zoramthanga said that

the task of providing aid to refugees in Mizoram amidst rising cases of COVID-19 had put great financial strain on the state government²⁶. The North Eastern states in India already lack sufficient infrastructure like proper roadways, hospitals, colleges, etc. Towns and villages in the border region are even more cut-off from the existing infrastructure, which is mostly concentrated in the capital cities. The refugee influx in the past two years has put further strain on their limited resources. Shortage in medical assistance has been most strongly felt. Refugees in camps in Mizoram said they needed water, more than anything else. Additionally, dismal living conditions, lack of access to sanitation, clean drinking water and adequate food has led to a surge of diseases and medical concerns within the refugee camps. NGOs, refugee doctors, etc. have set up camps to provide medical aid. However, with rising demand, their services have fallen short. The Chins being unable to communicate in local Mizo language has created greater hurdles in accessing aid and resources²⁷.

In May 2021, seven Myanmar nationals, including journalists, legislators and anti-coup activists were given passage from Manipur and Mizoram to New Delhi to appear before the UNHCR to seek refugee cards. This happened after the Manipur High Court gave its judgment, making a clear distinction between illegal migrants and refugees who have sought asylum to escape violence and persecution in their own countries. The court extended them interim protection under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution that guarantees right to life and liberty¹⁸. As conflict and violence rages on in Myanmar, the number of Myanmarese refugees entering Delhi are expected to increase and more and more refugees will start moving out of the North East in search of work and sustenance. With little hope of situations improving back home, refugees have started moving towards mainland Indian cities like Delhi, in search of work and resources. But New Delhi's diplomatic relations with the military junta ensure that their welcome will be less than warm. Till date, 5,092 individuals have approached UNHCR for registration in New Delhi, since February 2021¹⁵. In May 2022, Indian authorities even deported a Myanmar national from Moreh in Manipur²⁸.

GROWING DISTRESS AND APATHY

On the other hand, growing numbers of Chin and Kuki refugees in Manipur have ignited the fear of changes in Manipur's existing culture and demography amidst some tribal groups. Non-Kuki groups have also alleged that the refugees have taken over the hills and started encroaching upon the limited resources in the region, taking over the rights of the locals to government schemes and aid. As a response, civil society groups, including the Coordination Committee on Manipur Integrity (COCOMI), and Unified Naga Council (UNC) have come together to demand a National Register for Citizens (NRC) practice in Manipur

⁷Since January 2023, more than 170 refugees from Myanmar have been arrested and/or detained in Manipur. For more details see <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/refugees-03172023161746.html>



that can distinguish Indian nationals from the refugees and remove the latter²⁹. BJP Rajya Sabha MP and titular King of Manipur, Maharaja Leishemba Sanajaoba, also raised this issue at the parliament, asking the Government of India to fence the Manipur-Myanmar border to prevent refugees from entering the State³⁰.

INDIA'S STANCE AND SECURITY CONCERNS

Ever since the coup took place, India has maintained a cautious stance in relation to its diplomatic ties with Myanmar. India, for the past decades, has maintained an amiable relationship with the military in Myanmar. Although other countries have looked towards India to help restore democracy in Myanmar, India has maintained a soft approach towards the military junta mainly because it sees it as a partner in countering insurgency in the border regions of both countries³¹. India had condemned the coup in 2021 and raised concerns over military crackdowns and violence, but made a clear declaration that refugees fleeing the violence in Myanmar were not welcome in the country³¹. India also was part of the 8 countries that attended a military parade in Myanmar on 27th March 2021, just two months after the coup³².

The Government of India has also reportedly sold arms to the military junta³³. New Delhi also cancelled permissions for peaceful protests against the violence perpetrated by the junta in Myanmar. In November 2021, after the Indian Foreign Secretary's two-day visit to Myanmar, the Ministry of External Affairs issued a press release that explained that India had discussed infrastructure development, border security, etc. with the military government. It made no mention of India's hope for Myanmar to return to its democratic government³⁴. India's diplomatic relations with the junta can be ascribed to its security concerns and desire to ensure that the border region in the North East remains peaceful, unlike its disputes with China and Pakistan in the north. India's stance is also based on its economic interests of projects in Myanmar- Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (which runs through the Myanmar states of Chin and Rakhine); the Trilateral Highway Project (which is supposed to extend from India to Thailand); and accessing rich natural resources in the country which are mostly situated in areas controlled by armed ethnic militias³⁵.

CONCLUSION

However, such a stance will hurt India's interests in the long run. Continued violence in Myanmar will continue to displace people, which will increase refugee influx in India. Additionally, the projects that India hopes to implement have to go through the North Eastern states of Manipur and Mizoram – areas where insurgency and violence has only increased since the coup in Myanmar. This is especially

pertinent due to the presence of the PLA (People's Liberation Army) and ZRA (Zomi Revolutionary Army) in Manipur. PLA and ZRA are part of the many Chin armed insurgent groups fighting for dominance in Myanmar. They have been accused of weakening the resistance to military junta in Myanmar and siding with the latter³⁶. The murder of an army officer, his family, and four other officers in Manipur in November 2021 by the PLA and Manipur Naga People's Front is an example of such concerns³⁷.

Despite not being a signatory to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, India has ratified other international human rights instruments like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), among others, which provide some protection to refugee groups in India. Under these obligations, India cannot mistreat or deport its refugees. Amidst growing Hindu nationalism in India under the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Indian government's refugee response has become increasingly exclusionary. Refugee issues have served as a key election point since 2014 and anti-refugee rhetoric has infiltrated all forms of discussions and media³⁸. It is, therefore, crucial that the Government of India is pushed to build a national refugee policy that can ensure uniformity and transparency in its treatment of refugees³⁹.

REFERENCES

1. Global Appeal 2023. UNHCR Global Focus. 2023. Available from: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/globalappeal2023>.
2. 'Asia and the Pacific Regional Trends - Forced Displacement 2021'. UNHCR data portal. 2022. Available from: <https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/94372>.
3. Samaddar R. Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947 - 2000. Samaddar R, editor; India. SAGE Publications. 2003.
4. Khosla M. The Geopolitics of India's Refugee Policy. 2022. Available from: <https://southasianvoices.org/the-geopolitics-of-indias-refugee-policy/>.
5. Bhalla A. The need for refugee law in India. Bar and Bench. 2022. Available from: <https://www.barandbench.com/columns/the-need-for-refugee-law-in-india-for-indian-citizens>.
6. India Report. UNHCR. 2011. Available from: <https://www.unhcr.org/4cd96e919.pdf>.
7. The Returnees and the Refugees: Migration from Burma. In: Samaddar R, editor. Refugees and the State: Practices of Asylum and Care in India, 1947-2000. 2003.
8. Bhuyan A. Delhi's little Burma. Business Standard. 2013. Available from: https://www.business-standard.com/article/beyond-business/delhi-s-little-burma-113111400885_1.html.
9. Nandi J. Burmese refugees demand a life in Delhi. 2014. Available from: <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/delhi/burmese-refugees-demand-a-life-in-delhi/articleshow/44831815.cms>.
10. Field J, Tiwari AD, Mookherjee Y. Self-reliance as a Concept and a Spatial Practice for Urban Refugees: Reflections from Delhi, India. *Journal of Refugee Studies*. 2020;33(1):167-188. Available from: <https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/fez050>.
11. Sandhu K, Sebastian M. Rohingya and CAA: What is India's refugee policy?. 2022. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-62573446>.
12. Myanmar: Coup Leads to Crimes Against Humanity. 2021. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/31/myanmar-coup-leads-crimes-against-humanity>.



13. Ambarkhane S, Gathia SV. Over a Year Later, Myanmar's Military Coup Threatens India's National Security. 2022. Available from: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/05/over-year-later-myanmar-military-coup-threatens-indias-national-security>.
14. Wee S. Thousands Flee Myanmar for India Amid Fears of a Growing Refugee Crisis. 2021. Available from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/19/world/asia/myanmar-refugees-india.html>.
15. UNHCR Regional Bureau For Asia And Pacific (RBAP) Myanmar Emergency Update. UNHCR. 2023. Available from: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/4813>.
16. Bhattacharjee K. Treat our people as refugees: Myanmar's democracy leader urges Government of India. 2022. Available from: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/treat-our-people-as-refugees-myanmars-democracy-leader-urges-government-of-india/article66227432.ece>.
17. India: The Status of Refugees 2021. New Delhi, India. Rights and Risks Analysis Group. 2021.
18. Naqvi S. Myanmar: Don't allow migrants to cross, home ministry writes to border states. 2021. Available from: <https://www.eastmojo.com/mizoram/2021/03/11/myanmar-dont-allow-migrants-to-cross-home-ministry-writes-to-border-states/>.
19. Stop illegal influx from Myanmar, Centre tells northeastern States. 2021. Available from: <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/stop-illegal-influx-from-myanmar-mha-tells-ne-states/article34054308.ece>.
20. Manipur government asks DCs to "politely turn away" Myanmar refugees, takes back order. 2021. Available from: <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/manipur-government-asks-dcs-to-politely-turn-away-myanmar-refugees-takes-back-order/articleshow/81754323.cms?from=mdr>.
21. Manipur govt withdraws earlier order to 'politely turn away' Myanmar refugees. 2021. Available from: <https://www.livemint.com/news/india/manipur-govt-withdraws-earlier-order-to-politely-turn-away-myanmar-refugees-11617084905271.html>.
22. Hangal N, Sitlou M. Manipuris Help Myanmar Refugees, Ignoring BJP Order To 'Politely' Turn Them Away. 2021. Available from: <https://article-14.com/post/manipuris-help-myanmar-refugees-ignoring-bjp-order-to-politely-turn-them-away>.
23. Karmakar S. Not acceptable to Mizoram: CM Zoramthanga writes to PM Modi on Myanmar refugees. 2021. Available from: <https://www.deccanherald.com/national/east-and-northeast/not-acceptable-to-mizoram-cm-zoramthanga-writes-to-pm-modi-on-myanmar-refugees-964309.html>.
24. How are Mizos dealing with Burmese refugees fleeing the coup?. 2021. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I23zSkLJN8&t=76s>.
25. Choudhury A, Agarwala T. How Mizoram has set up a de facto asylum regime for Myanmar refugees. 2022. Available from: <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/how-mizoram-has-set-up-de-facto-asylum-regime-for-myanmar-refugees-8189791/>.
26. Chakraborty T. 'Financially Strained,' Mizoram CM Brings up Myanmar Refugee Crisis in Meeting With PM. 2021. Available from: <https://thewire.in/government/mizoram-cm-zoramthanga-pm-modi-myanmar-refugees-humanitarian-aid>.
27. Sitlhou M. Mizoram's predicament over Myanmar refugees. 2022. Available from: <https://lifestyle.livemint.com/news/big-story/mizorams-predicament-over-myanmar-refugees-111664461046718.html>.
28. Myanmarese national deported. 2022. Available from: <https://www.ifp.co.in/manipur/myanmarese-national-deported>.
29. Matharu S. 'They're taking over our hills': Manipur groups want NRC to weed out Myanmar refugees. 2022. Available from: <https://theprint.in/features/theyre-taking-over-our-hills-manipur-groups-want-nrc-to-weed-out-myanmar-refugees/100227/>.
30. Maharaja Sanajaoba urges India Government to resolve Indo-Myanmar Border Issue, complete fencing. 2022. Available from: <https://www.pothashang.in/2022/12/09/maharaja-sanajaoba-urges-india-government-to-resolve-indo-myanmar-border-issue-complete-fencing/>.
31. Min M. India's cautious approach to the military coup in Myanmar. 2022. Available from: <https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/22/indias-cautious-approach-to-the-military-coup-in-myanmar/>.
32. Anand A. India attends military parade in Myanmar 2 months after coup. Why it's significant. 2021. Available from: <https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/india-attends-military-parade-myanmar-months-after-coup-why-significant-1785075-2021-03-30>.
33. Indian Arms Exporter Ships Air-Defense Weapons to Myanmar's Junta. 2021. Available from: <https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/indian-arms-exporter-ships-air-defense-weapons-to-myanmars-junta.html>.
34. Rajagopalan R. India Engages Myanmar. 2022. Available from: <https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-engages-myanmar/>.
35. Martin M. Prime Minister Modi and Myanmar's Military Junta. 2021. Available from: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/prime-minister-modi-and-myanmars-military-junta>.
36. Sitlou M, Hanghal N. Insurgents from India add fuel to fire in Myanmar's restive north. 2022. Available from: <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Myanmar-Crisis/Insurgents-from-India-add-fuel-to-fire-in-Myanmar-s-restive-north>.
37. Hangsing S, Tonsing S. Has Military Rule in Myanmar Affected India's 'Act East' Policy?. 2022. Available from: <https://thewire.in/south-asia/has-military-rule-in-myanmar-affected-indias-act-east-policy>.
38. Purayil MP. The Myanmar Coup and India's Refugee Policy. 2021. Available from: <https://southeastianvoices.org/the-myanmar-coup-and-indias-refugee-policy/>.
39. Purayil MP, Purayil MP. India has a Responsibility towards Myanmar Refugees in India. *Economic and Political Weekly (Engage)*. 2022;57(49):1-17. Available from: <https://www.epw.in/engage/article/india-has-responsibility-towards-myanmar-refugees>.

