Journal of Contemporary Politics

Abstract

The de facto suspension of the Indus Water Treaty, 1960, announced by India on 22 April was one of the series of punitive measures adopted by India in response to the Pahalgam terror attack. Use of water as a weapon is a double-edged sword and it is, therefore, essential to consider the potential pitfalls of its employment so that suitable mitigation measures can planned well in advance. This paper attempts to examine the various technical and legal aspects of the treaty, as also, the diplomatic and strategic implications of India’s decision to hold the treaty in abeyance. The waters of the Indus River system are the main reason why Pakistan continues to consider Jammu & Kashmir as its jugular vein and is therefore likely to be extremely sensitive regarding any attempts to dilute the treaty. India, on the other hand, has reasonable grounds for seeking to de-facto suspend the treaty since it was negotiated in good faith, and Pakistan, by using terrorism as coercive instrument of forcing its will on the Kashmir issue, has shown anything but good faith. Moreover, India has valid grounds to ask for the treaty to be renegotiated as over time, our water requirements have grown and giving away nearly 80% of the waters of the Western Rivers is no longer considered prudent. India could use Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on Treaties,1969, which gives out rules and procedures for interpreting, amending or even terminating a treaty on grounds of fundamental change in circumstances.

Keywords: Hybrid Warfare, Water Wars, Indus Water Treaty, Jammu & Kashmir, Op Sindoor, Indo-Pak Conflict, Vienna Convention on Treaties